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AMENDING THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE: HOW WILL A CHANGE IN SCOPE ALTER 
THE CONCEPT OF GOODS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The continued rise in electronic commerce has changed the way that 
the world does business.1 Instead of traditional methods of sale, where 
buyers physically inspect and approve goods before payment and delivery, 
the character of sales transactions is now less straightforward and certainly 
much less hands-on than it had been in the past. Frequently, digital 
products are sent electronically with nothing tangible ever touching the 
hands of either the buyer or the seller.2 Software sales, for example, often 
require buyers to accept the terms of a contract before they have even been 
made aware of the nature of those terms.3 These and other changes in 
commercial transactions have created the need for a revision of Article 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which regards sales.4 At the 
time of this writing, the American Law Institute (“ALI”)5 and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)6 had 
 1. Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 673 
PLI/PAT 121, 129–30 (2000).  
 2. Sellers of an intangible product often just send the product electronically. On the other end, 
the purchaser receives the electronic transmission, and then wires money from his own bank account 
and directly deposits the payment in the account of the seller. In such a transaction, no product was 
ever physically in the hands of either buyer or seller, and no tangible form of money ever changed 
hands—the entire transaction was conducted electronically. 
 3. Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, AFFECT: What is UCITA? Glossary 
of Terms, at http://www.ucita.com/what_glossary.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). Software 
manufacturers often use what is known as a “shrink-wrap” license or a “click-on” license. Id. These 
licenses are contracts that are created when a user opens the plastic wrapping on the outside of the 
software packaging (in the case of shrink-wrap licensing) or when a user clicks a box indicating 
agreement with the terms of the contract, which (in the case of click-on licensing) commonly occurs 
during the initial set-up of the program. Id. In each of these cases, users are not made aware of the 
terms of the contract until after they have given their assent. Id. 
 4. U.C.C. § 2 (2001). In its entirety, the UCC governs numerous other types of commercial 
transactions: leases (Article 2A); commercial paper (Article 3); bank deposits and collections (Article 
4); funds transfers (Article 4A); letters of credit (Article 5); bulk transfers (Article 6); receipts, bills of 
lading and other documents of title (Article 7); investment securities (Article 8); and secured 
transactions, sales of accounts and chattel paper (Article 9). See U.C.C. (2001). 
 5. The American Law Institute is an organization of lawyers which drafts and revises the UCC 
and produces restatements on subjects such as contracts and torts. See generally The American Law 
Institute, at http://www.ali.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 6. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is an organization of 
lawyers who are appointed by the executive branch of each state. NCCUSL drafts and revises the UCC 
in cooperation with ALI and also drafts uniform laws on various other subjects. See generally The 
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recently agreed to amend7 Article 2 to expressly exclude the term 
“information” from the definition of goods.8
Though the proposed amendment to Article 2 has been approved,9 a 
substantial amount of uncertainty is likely to exist regarding the Article’s 
scope.10 In the past, some courts have considered information such as 
software to be a good and therefore they have applied the law of Article 2 
in ruling upon such transactions.11 For these courts, the propriety of 
characterizing information as a good was even more apparent when the 
product was a hybrid of sorts—part tangible good, part information.12 
However, post-amendment the treatment of these hybrid products is a 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at http://www.nccusl.org (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2003). 
 7. See infra notes 103–23 and accompanying text. The copyright to the UCC is jointly held by 
ALI and NCCUSL. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Information 
About the Text of the U.C.C., at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/informationaboutucc.asp (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2004). An editorial board, made up of members of each of the two organizations, is 
responsible for formulating policy regarding the text of the UCC. Id. 
 8. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003) (reviewing amendments proposed by NCCUSL and outlining future plans for the proposal); 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 2—Sales, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/2002act.htm (last 
modified August 2, 2002) (proposing the express exclusion of information from the definition of 
goods). The proposal also contained several amendments unrelated to the definition of goods. The 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to Uniform Commercial 
Code Article 2—Sales, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/2002act.htm (last modified Aug. 2, 
2002). 
 9. See infra notes 121–24. 
 10. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). NCCUSL’s Preliminary Comment gave an extremely limited amount of guidance, stating 
that “transactions often include both goods and information: some are transactions in goods as that 
term is used in Section 2-102, and some are not.” Id. The question, however, is which transactions are 
goods and which transactions are not. Obviously, the definition of what is and what is not a good is 
still unclear. 
 11. See Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998); Advent 
Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 
543 (9th Cir. 1985); ePresence, Inc. v. Evolve Software, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. Mass. 2002); 
Softman Prod. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Newcourt Fin. USA, 
Inc. v. FT Mortgage Cos., 161 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., 
Inc., 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The issue of software as a good has been heavily debated. See 
generally Amelia H. Boss & William J. Woodward, Scope of the Uniform Commercial Code; Survey 
of Computer Contracting Cases, 43 BUS. LAW. 1513 (1988); Jeffrey B. Ritter, Scope of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Computer Contracting Cases and Electronic Commercial Practices, 45 BUS. LAW. 
2533 (1990); Jeffrey B. Ritter, Software Transactions and Uniformity: Accommodating Codes Under 
the Code, 46 BUS. LAW. 1825 (1991); Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853 (1986); Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, 
Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking the Byte Out of the 
Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129 (1985) . 
 12. See supra note 11. 
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foreseeable source of uncertainty.13 Considering the wide range of current 
products that incorporate software and other types of information into a 
core good,14 much uncertainty exists as to what law is best suited to 
govern such transactions.15 The purpose of this Note is to discuss, 
considering traditional judicial reasoning regarding what constitutes a 
good as defined by Article 2, how the change in scope will likely affect 
judicial decisions with respect to the applicability of Article 2 to 
transactions involving a mix of information and goods.16
Part II of this Note examines the history of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, specifically of Article 2, and its application. Part III analyzes the 
methods of past judicial reasoning regarding the legal nature of particular 
goods. Part IV of this note proposes how courts should interpret the term 
“information” under the revised definition of goods and what law should 
be applied to those transactions involving both goods and a component of 
information. Part V proposes that courts use a “predominant purpose” 
test17 to determine what law should govern transactions involving mixed 
products containing both goods and information. 
II. HISTORY 
In the middle of the twentieth century the idea to draft a uniform code 
governing consumer transactions in sales and other financial areas was 
formed.18 The drafters intended for the code to “foster freedom of contract 
and to facilitate the creation of, and reliance upon, commercial contractual 
relationships.”19 The drafters proposed to achieve these goals by having 
 13. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last viewed 
Jan. 26, 2003) (stating that Article 2’s application will be for courts to determine). The uncertainty lies 
in contemplating what mixed-goods products will fall within the scope of Article 2. Id. 
 14. The list is nearly infinite: “smart cars,” refrigerators, palm pilots, computers, security alarms, 
climate control systems, heart monitors, books, telephone directories, and numerous others. At a local 
department store, a walk down one aisle alone could reveal many products that would fall into the grey 
area that exists between pure good and pure information. 
 15. Courts have the option of resolving the matter using Article 2, the common law, or the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”). For a discussion of UCITA, see infra 
notes 89–102 and accompanying text. 
 16. This Note focuses on the contractual side of mixed-goods transactions. While this Note does 
incorporate select concepts from the field of intellectual property, the issues and perspectives are 
analyzed with the goal of examining governing law, rather than focusing on issues of ownership based 
on copyright or patent.  
 17. See infra notes 145–59.
 18. Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law—What Law Applies to Transactions in 
Information, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999).  
 19. Id. at 4. With the safeguards of the Code in place, consumers could be more secure in 
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contract rules “serve a background function, providing rules appropriate to 
the commercial relationship.”20 These background rules, however, were 
meant to fill in the missing gaps in the contract, and therefore were to be 
“subject to the dominant effect of the parties’ agreement.”21
Karl Llewellyn drafted Article 2 in order to distinguish law regulating 
the sale of goods from general contract law.22 The Article was designed to 
be flexible23 and it allowed parties to a contract to “adapt its provisions by 
agreement.”24 Such agreements included “course of performance, course 
of dealing, and usage of trade . . . .”25 Parties subject to the Code then 
relied on courts to “apply its provisions sensibly.”26 While drafted to 
govern only sales law, Article 2 eventually influenced other areas of 
contract law, as many courts applied it by analogy to transactions other 
than those involving goods.27
Article 2 defines goods as “all things . . . which are moveable at the 
time of identification to the contract for sale . . . .”28 This definition was 
entering into transactions. Id. The UCC could be relied upon to protect their interests. Id. 
 20. Id. at 5. 
 21. Id. The Code was only designed to be a default set of provisions, giving parties some 
minimal level of protection. Id. at 12. If parties wanted to agree to waive certain provisions of an 
applicable article, in most circumstances they were able to do so. Id. In addition, parties were given the 
freedom to add to a contract any clauses which were more stringent than those imposed by the Code. 
Id. The Code was meant to be a starting point, with the parties free to take the transaction in the 
direction they so desired. Id. Karl Llewellyn initiated a general approach to contracting, expressing the 
belief that “default rules should mesh with expected or conventional practice in a manner that projects 
a favorable and predictable result if the parties’ agreement does not alter the rule.” Id. 
 22. Id. at 7–8. 
 23. Id. at 12. 
 24. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). As Professor Nimmer pointed out, “a rule which does not reflect reasonable commercial 
understandings in a particular area of commerce penalizes parties who did not negotiate or otherwise 
deal with the issue by forcing recourse to courts for . . . a commercially reasonable result.” Nimmer, 
supra note 18, at 14. 
 25. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Nimmer, supra note 18, at 17. See also Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: 
What Courts and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 DUQ. L. 
REV. 255, 264 (2000) (stating that Article 2 influences transactions where courts treat the transaction 
“as if it were a transaction in goods when it is not, where courts apply the law of sales by analogy to a 
transaction admittedly not a transaction in goods, and by shaping views of what is appropriate common 
law for transactions other than transactions in goods”). 
 28. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1998). The provision in full states that: 
“[g]oods” means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at 
the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to 
be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action. “Goods” also includes the 
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written at a time when the United States operated in a pure goods-based 
economy.29 A typical transaction of the time period in which the Code was 
drafted involved a tangible physical good.30 Because these products fell 
clearly within the definition of “goods,”31 they were unquestionably 
covered by the provisions of Article 2.32 Such tangible goods could usually 
be inspected by the buyer prior to purchase33 and were often protected by 
the warranty of merchantability.34  
Less certain to be considered goods were products consisting of both a 
physical good and a service.35 When a transaction such as this occurred, 
unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as 
described in the section on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107). 
Id. 
 29. Nimmer, supra note 18, at 3. 
 30. “[L]and ownership and agrarian production were primary sources of wealth and income . . . 
and contracts for the exchange of horses and grain dominated the commercial landscape.” UNIF. 
COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, Prefatory Note, 7 U.L.A. 196. “Following the industrial 
revolution, manufactured goods assumed center stage.” Id. This change prompted Karl Llewellyn to 
implement a revision of the then-current law of sales. Id. at 187. 
 31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 32. Id. 
 33. U.C.C. § 2-513(1) (1989). The provision states that:  
Unless otherwise agreed and subject to subsection (3), where goods are tendered or delivered 
or identified to the contract for sale, the buyer has a right before payment or acceptance to 
inspect them at any reasonable place and time and in any reasonable manner. When the seller 
is required or authorized to send the goods to the buyer, the inspection may be after their 
arrival. 
Id. The accompanying comment elaborates, noting that the buyer: 
[M]ay exercise his right of inspection at any reasonable time or place and in any reasonable 
manner. It is not necessary that he select the most appropriate time, place or manner to inspect 
or that his selection be the customary one in the trade or locality. Any reasonable time, place 
or manner is available to him and the reasonableness will be determined by trade usages, past 
practices between the parties and the other circumstances of the case. 
Id. at Official Comment, n.3. 
 34. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1989). The provision, in part, states that  
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to 
goods of that kind. . . .  
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without objection in the trade 
under the contract description; and (b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average 
quality within the description; and (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods 
are used; and (d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality 
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and (e) are adequately contained, 
packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and (f) conform to the promises or 
affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any. 
Id. at § 2-314(1) and (2). Purchasers of covered goods could therefore rely on the warranty of 
merchantability to ensure that the goods they bought were quality products that were able to function 
as intended. 
 35. See infra notes 36–55 and accompanying text. Examples of this type of mixed-product are 
contracts for computer systems with accompanying troubleshooting, contracts for building and 
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most courts used one of two methods to determine whether the product 
qualified as a good under Article 2’s definition: the predominant purpose 
test36 or the gravamen test.37
The test most commonly used by the courts was the predominant 
purpose test.38 Under this test, the court first identified the predominant 
element of the transaction.39 This was accomplished by examining several 
factors including “the terminology of the contract, the objective of the 
parties in entering the contract, the ratio of the price of the goods to the 
whole price of the contract, the nature of the business of the supplier, and 
the intrinsic value of the goods without the service.”40 Consideration of 
multiple factors was consistent with the underlying purpose of Article 2—
to provide flexibility by allowing parties to enter into transactions based 
on their own terms.41
After the predominant element was identified, the court used that 
identification to determine whether the predominant purpose of the 
transaction was to sell goods or to sell services.42 The progression from 
predominant element to predominant purpose is a sensible interpretation, 
as a party should not be governed by an unfavorable law simply due to the 
fact that a service component was included, for example, in the washing 
machine that the party purchased.43 Reason follows that those transactions 
of which the predominant purpose was to sell goods fall under the 
governance of Article 2;44 those meant to sell services are governed 
otherwise.45
installation, sales of home appliance with warranty and service packages, and the like. 
 36. Id. at 279. 
 37. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 27, at 278. 
 38. Id. See USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) 
(applying the predominant purpose test to the design, installation, and service of a computer ‘turnkey’ 
system); Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 450 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Design Data 
Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 503 N.W.2d 552 (Neb. 1993) (applying the predominant purpose test to 
the sale of computer equipment); Kirkpatrick v. Introspect Healthcare Corp., 845 P.2d 800 (N.M. 
1992) (applying the predominant purpose test to an interior design and subsequent decorating 
contract); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 502 N.E.2d 713 (Ohio Misc. 1986); Tacoma Athletic 
Club, Inc. v. Indoor Comfort Sys., Inc., 902 P.2d 175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (applying the 
predominant purpose test to the sale and installation of a dehumidification system). 
 39. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 27, at 278. 
 40. HENRY D. GABRIEL & LINDA J. RUSCH, THE ABCS OF THE UCC, ARTICLE 2: SALES 5 
(Amelia M. Boss ed., 1997). 
 41. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 42. GABRIEL & RUSCH, supra note 40, at 5. 
 43. A seller should not be able to select governing law merely by including a service or a good 
component in the overall product package. 
 44. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 27, at 278. 
 45. Id. 
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In Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc.,46 the Michigan Court of 
Appeals used the predominant purpose test to determine whether mixed 
contracts for goods and services were governed by Article 2.47 In 
performing the test, the court adopted the prior decision of the Eighth 
Circuit in Bonebrake v. Cox.48 The Bonebrake court described the 
determinative test as not one testing “whether [goods] are mixed, but, 
granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their 
thrust, their purpose reasonably stated, is the rendition of service with 
goods incidentally involved . . . or is a transaction of sale, with labor 
incidentally involved . . . . .”49 Based on the application of the predominant 
purpose test, the Neibarger court held that a contract for the installation of 
a milking system for dairy cows was a transaction for the sale of goods, 
with services incidentally involved.50 The contract was therefore governed 
by Article 2.51
A minority of courts, on the other hand, have used the gravamen test.52 
Rather than attempting to determine the predominant purpose of the 
transaction, these courts have examined the grounds for a party’s 
complaint.53 Under the predominant purpose test, one law governs both the 
goods and services components; in the gravamen test, however, a different 
law applies to each component.54 If a party’s dissatisfaction is aimed at the 
portion of the product involving goods, Article 2 applies; if the complaint 
concerns the services included, common law governs.55
 46. 450 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 49. Neibarger, 450 N.W. 2d at 90 (quoting Bonebrake, 499 F.2d at 860). As an example of a 
contract for service with goods involved only incidentally, the Bonebrake court described a contract 
with an artist for a painting. Bonebrake, 499 F.2d at 960. As an example of a transaction of sale with 
labor incidentally involved, the court described the installation of a water heater for a bathroom. Id. 
Note the distinction: in the former example, where the skill and imagination of each artist is different, 
the purchaser is most interested in having that particular artist create a painting. In the latter, however, 
the underlying desire is a water heater. As long as the water heater is properly installed, the particular 
company or individual that performed the installation and service is of little matter. 
 50. Id. at 90. This is similar to the water heater example discussed supra in note 49. The service 
of the milking system is not the fundamental part of the package—it is the milking device that the 
owner needs to operate his business. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 27, at 279. 
 53. Id. The advantage to a split-application of law is that the correct law would govern each part. 
Id. This is in contrast to the predominant purpose test, where incorrect law will always apply to at least 
one part of the transaction. Id. at 278. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. Should the dispute involve both aspects of the product, each would be governed by its 
applicable authority. Id. 
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While courts have become quite proficient in determining Article 2’s 
application to transactions involving either goods, services, or mixed-
goods comprised of both goods and services,56 a rise in electronic 
commerce has presented a new brand of exchange—that of information, 
both computer-based and tangible.57 Article 2 is not tailored to these new 
types of commerce.58 “[U]nlike tangible goods, computer information is 
very easily copied and, therefore, susceptible to piracy.”59 Scholars have 
feared that “without new rules, there would be few protections for 
software publishers from unauthorized copying.”60 Nonetheless, some 
courts have applied Article 2 to these new products,61 despite the fact that 
transactions in software, computer output, and data are neither supported 
by the policies underlying the Article62 nor do they fit neatly within the 
traditional notion of a good.63  
In 1991, ALI and NCCUSL decided to amend Article 2 to make the 
law of sales more applicable to these new forms of transactions occurring 
 56. Courts sometimes provide surprising determinations however. See Hedges v. Pub. Serv. Co., 
396 N.E.2d 933, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (declaring that electricity used in the home is a good, but 
that raw voltage is not); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. 1991) 
(declaring the predominant purpose of a sale of advertising space is to sell a service contract, putting it 
outside the scope of Article 2). These surprising decisions have served to further blur the already-fuzzy 
line dividing those products included in the scope of Article 2 from those that are excluded. 
 57. Boss, supra note 1. 
 58. Id. at 129–30. Initially, the focus and main concern regarding Article 2 was on its 
applicability to warranties and remedies in the software context. Id. at 130. Later, the concern 
expanded to encompass other intellectual property concepts as well. Id. at 131. To illustrate an 
example of the changes in commerce that have emerged since the Code was originally drafted, 
Professor Nimmer poses the following question: “What . . . is the role of a ‘right to inspect’ before 
payment . . . in a contract to view a motion picture at a theatre?” Nimmer, supra note 18, at 21. For 
example, once one has “inspected” a motion picture and other similar goods, the seller cannot reclaim 
the product. He may take the physical movie reel, but he cannot reclaim the picture that the buyer saw 
with his own eyes. 
 59. Riva F. Kinstlick, Overview of UCITA, 673 PLI/PAT 59, 65 (2001). Computer goods present 
different challenges than tangible goods, most of which cannot be copied, at least in the short term, 
and usually cannot be pirated. Id. at 66. Such concerns did not commonly appear in transactions 
occurring before the rise of use of electronic data. 
 60. Id. at 65. 
 61. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Microsystems, Inc. v. Pub. Safety Sys., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1352 
(D. Colo. 1998); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979); 
Richard Haney Ford, Inc. v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., 461 S.E.2d 282 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). The 
application of Article 2 by analogy, as described in note 27, supra, appears to continue in those courts 
which hold that pure information without a tangible component is also governed by Article 2. 
 62. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
 63. Id. See also Nimmer, supra note 18, at 21 (arguing that while judges might be able to bend 
and stretch the UCC far enough to encompass new types of transactions, such an analogy approach 
would not produce necessary consistency or predictability in the outcomes of litigation). See generally 
Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass, supra note 27, at 266. 
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in the marketplace.64 The amendment process was designed to “update the 
Article to accommodate electronic commerce and to reflect development 
of business practices, changes in other law, and interpretive difficulties of 
practical significance.”65 The process lasted more than ten years,66 but both 
ALI and NCCUSL have finally given the formal approval necessary to 
amend the Code.67
In the initial stages of the amendment attempt, Professor Raymond 
Nimmer proposed a “hub and spoke” approach.68 This approach left 
general contract law principles in place to govern all types of sales.69 
While the general principles provided the hub, the “licensing of 
intangibles and the sale of goods would be treated in separate chapters,”70 
acting as spokes of the hub.71 This method of revision recognized that “in 
the generic area of contracting, there was a great deal of overlap between 
contracts for the transfer of goods and contracts for the transfer of 
information.”72 Although certain facets of information contracts would 
require different provisions, the similarities “justif[ied] a core set of 
provisions governing both goods and information contracts, with special 
rules as necessary to deal with the unique aspects of each.”73
 64. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). 
 65. Id. “Revolutions in telecommunications and computer technology have made geography 
increasingly irrelevant to modern commerce. The Internet enables small firms as well as large ones to 
provide products and services throughout the country and around the world.”UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. 
TRANSACTIONS ACT, supra note 30, at Preftory Note. 
 66. The ALI Reporter (Summer 2002), UCC Update, at http://www.ali.org/ali/R2404-
_3_UCC.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 67. The amended code can now be sent to the states for proposal and enactment because the 
membership of both NCCUSL and ALI have approved identical drafts. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 
65.See also Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to the Scope of Article 2, The American 
Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 68. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 66. 
 69. Id. According to Professor Nimmer, there are several generic themes underlying contract law. 
One theme is a requirement that interpretation of contracts apply concepts of practical construction. 
Nimmer, supra note 18, at 19. This means that courts are to “consider usage of the trade, course of 
dealing, and course of performance in interpreting [an] agreement and its terms.” Id. See generally 
U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1998). Another central theme is vesting courts with the authority to nullify a 
contractual term believed to be unconscionable. Nimmer, supra note 18, at 20. The authority to 
invalidate unconscionable terms is to be used when “in the light of the general commercial background 
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be 
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.” U.C.C. 
§ 2-302 cmt. 1 (1998). Beyond generic themes, however, provisions drafted with a focus on sales law 
become much less applicable to other types of contracts. Nimmer, supra note 18, at 21. 
 70. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 66. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Boss, supra note 1, at 131. 
 73. Id. at 132. 
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After a relatively brief attempt at making the proposal work, the 
leadership of NCCUSL rejected the hub and spoke approach.74 The abrupt 
abandonment was justified not on the basis that “information and software 
were significantly different,”75 but “on the basis that the logistics of 
restructuring Article 2 into a hub with spokes would require extraordinary 
time and resources.”76
During the same period that ALI and NCCUSL began attempts to 
amend Article 2, the software industry also underwent a major 
transformation.77 Large mass-marketing software publishers, such as 
Microsoft, were beginning to dominate small custom developers.78 These 
large publishers were also starting to exercise political influence over the 
drafting process.79
After rejecting the hub and spoke proposal, NCCUSL’s Executive 
Committee adopted the Business Software Alliance’s80 proposal to draft a 
separate article designed to govern software contracts.81 The Alliance’s 
proposal argued that, because computer information usually took the form 
of a conferred license rather than an outright sale, Article 2 did not have 
the flexibility to deal with the issues involved.82 This distinction, 
according to Professor Nimmer, was based on the fact that “information 
 74. Id. The decision was made with little input from the ALI, NCCUSL’s supposed partner in the 
revision process. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. It is somewhat ironic that the hub –and spoke approach was abandoned to save time and 
effort, especially since the revision remained in the works for over ten years. Boss finds it likely that 
an “unarticulated motive” was behind the departure from the hub and spoke approach, namely pressure 
from the software industry. Id. Article 2 was seen as liberal, in contrast to the conservative ideas and 
nature of software companies. Id. at 133. 
 77. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 66. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Founded in 1988, the Business Software Alliance has programs in 65 countries across the 
globe. The Business Software Alliance, at http://www.bsa.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). The 
Business Software Alliance describes itself as “the voice of the world’s commercial software before 
governments and in the international marketplace.” Id. Members of the Alliance “represent the fastest 
growing industry in the world,” and include such notable names as Microsoft, Apple, and Adobe 
Systems. Id. The purpose of the Business Software Alliance is to “educate[] consumers on software 
management and copyright protection, cyber security, trade, e-commerce and other internet-related 
industries.” Id. For a complete listing of all world wide members, see The Business Software Alliance, 
BSA Members, at http://www.bsa.org/usa/about/members (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 UCITA is accused of heavily favoring the interests of software sellers and manufacturers, which 
seems to be a legitimate concern given the level of contribution and input from software companies. 
See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
 81. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 66. 
 82. Id. 
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and other license contracts entail far different commercial and practical 
considerations than can be addressed under a sale of goods model.”83
The separate section, Article 2B, was formally named “Licensing.”84 
Unfortunately, the two organizations could not agree on the language of 
the proposed amendment.85 Although NCCUSL was slated to approve the 
new section, ALI delayed taking any action on the proposed section 
because of “significant reservations about both some of its key substantive 
provisions and its overall clarity and coherence.”86 In 1999, ALI withdrew 
its support from the project,87 citing concerns “including matters of 
substance, process, and product.”88
Rather than letting the concept of a code governing software contracts 
disappear entirely, NCCUSL went forward with the project, renaming it 
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”).89 The 
Act was designed to “codif[y] rules governing commercial transactions, 
usually licenses, in computer information.”90 These rules were designed to 
encompass “software licensing, online access and other transactions in 
computer information.”91  
Despite its attempt to reform the law governing modern computer 
transactions, UCITA has not been met with open arms.92 In fact, UCITA 
 83. Id. This is in direct contrast to the hub and spoke model, which was based on the belief that 
the amount of overlap between contracts governing goods and information was substantial enough to 
justify a core group of provisions regulating both, with differences being addressed by different 
spokes. 
 84. Boss, supra note 1, at 135. 
 85. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 67 (citing The ALI Reporter (Spring 1999), at 
http://www.ali.org/ali/R2103_Art2b.htm). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Boss, supra note 1, at 135. 
 88. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 67. The committee further stated that “[i]n terms of product, the 
draft . . . sacrificed the flexibility necessary to accommodate continuing fast-paced changes in 
technology, distribution, and contracting. In terms of process, the guiding principle appeared to be the 
Conference’s desire to expedite approval and commence enactment of the draft.” Id.  
 89. NCCUSL did not have the option of unilaterally amending Article 2, because approval must 
be given by the bodies of both NCCUSL and ALI. See supra note 67. NCCUSL was not, however, 
restricted from undertaking the abandoned project on its own, as long as it was formed as a separate 
law to those already existing as part of the UCC. UCITA should not be confused with the Uniform 
Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”), which governs individuals who contract electronically. Boss, 
supra note 1, at 158. 
 90. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 67. The language of UCITA is thought to have been heavily 
influenced by the software industry who sought to make shrink-wrap licenses enforceable. Id. 
 91. Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions AFFECT: What is UCITA? 
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.ucita.com/what_faq.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 92. See generally Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, at 
http://www.ucita.com (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). A group known as Americans for Fair Electronic 
Commerce Transactions (“AFFECT”) has been one of UCITA’s most outspoken opponents. Id. The 
group has launched a full-scale attack on UCITA, encouraging others to become involved and resist 
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has thus far been enacted in only two states: Virginia and Maryland.93 
However, even these two states which have adopted UCITA have taken 
steps to determine what amendments to the Act are desirable94 and to 
discuss further legislation.95 While individual state amendments to UCITA 
could improve consumer rights, any substantial change in the language of 
UCITA will destroy the entire purpose of the Act: to have uniformity in all 
states.96
what the group sees as an extremely unfair and disadvantageous law. Id. AFFECT argues that 
“American copyright law has balanced the interests of creators with the needs of the society to use and 
create new information. UCITA upsets this balance.” Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce 
Transactions, AFFECT: What is UCITA? Myths and Facts, at http://www.ucita.com/what_myths.html 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2003). See also http://www.badsoftware.com (maintained by Cem Kaner, 
Professor of Software Engineering at Florida Institute of Technology) (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 93. Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, Myths and Facts, supra note 91. 
According to AFFECT, UCITA has been opposed or criticized by 32 State Attorneys General, the 
Federal Trade Commission, 11 different software developers, six different consumer advocates (one of 
the six is an individual), more than 12 different industry associations, five separate library 
organizations, two independent information content developers, 50 intellectual property professors, 43 
contract law professors, and one intellectual property law bar association. Id. See Americans for Fair 
Electronic Commerce Transactions Website, AFFECT: What is UCITA? What Others Say—
Comprehensive List, at http://www.ucita.com/say_list.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003), for a complete 
list of organizations which oppose UCITA. But see Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 75 (stating that motion 
picture and broadcast industries dropped opposition to UCITA after “securing packages of exemptions 
they had sought for some years”). 
 Although only Virginia and Maryland have actually enacted UCITA, several other states have 
shown some form of interest regarding UCITA. See The American Library Association, at 
http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/copyrightb/ucita/states.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). 
States such as Texas, Washington, Oregon, Oklahoma, New Hampshire, Nevada, and Arizona have 
had legislation introduced in the past. Id. 
 94. Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, Myths and Facts, supra note 91. 
 95. Id. The Virginia legislature alone received 74 proposals on how UCITA should be amended 
for Virginia law. Id. One additional section that was added deals with licenses to nonprofit libraries, 
archives, or educational institutions. The addition, in pertinent part, reads: 
(a) To the extent that the conduct is not otherwise unlawful or restricted under the Copyright 
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., or other law, in a standard form contract for the use of a tangible 
copy of informational content to a licensee that is a nonprofit library or archive or a nonprofit 
educational institution, the licensee may, without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial 
advantage: (1) make the tangible copy available to library or archive users . . . ; (2) make a 
copy of the tangible copy for archival or preservation purposes; (3) engage in inter-library 
lending . . . ; and (4) make classroom and instructional use of the tangible copy. 
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) may be varied by a term in a standard form contract only 
if: (1) the term varying the provision is conspicuous; (2) the nonprofit library, archive or 
educational institution specifically manifests assent to the term. . . .  
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-503.10 (Michie 2001). The Virginia provision appears to be an attempt to 
eliminate the troubles for libraries that are so strongly pointed to by AFFECT. See supra note 92. 
 96. Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions AFFECT: What is UCITA? What’s 
Wrong With UCITA?, at http://www.ucita.com/what _problems.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
Consumers will still be dealing with a large number of differing laws, requiring knowledge of each in 
order to properly protect their rights in transactions. 
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Some states, such as Iowa, Vermont, West Virginia,97 and North 
Carolina,98 have gone so far as to take proactive steps by enacting “bomb-
shelter” laws to ensure that UCITA will never be applied to consumers in 
those states.99 The main impetus behind such statutes is that UCITA 
allows software licensors to select the law of any state to resolve license 
disputes and to choose any state as the location where disputes will be 
resolved.100 Without bomb-shelter laws, even citizens of states that choose 
not to enact UCITA will be subject to UCITA’s choice of law provision.101 
The negative treatment states give UCITA is likely based on UCITA’s 
 97. See W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (Michie Supp. 2003). The West Virginia statute states that: 
A choice of law provision in a computer information agreement which provides that the 
contract is to be interpreted pursuant to the laws of a state that has enacted uniform computer 
information transactions act, as proposed by the national conference of commissioners on 
uniform state laws, or any substantially similar law, is voidable and the agreement shall be 
interpreted pursuant to the laws of this state if the party against whom enforcement of the 
choice of law provision is sought is a resident of this state or has its principal place of 
business located in this state. For purposes of this section, a "computer information 
agreement" means an agreement that would be governed by the uniform computer 
transactions act or substantially similar law as enacted in the state specified in the choice of 
laws provision if that state's laws were applied to the agreement. 
Id. 
 98. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2003). The North Carolina statute is very similar to the West 
Virginia provision; see supra note 97. The North Carolina statute states: 
A choice of law provision in a computer information agreement which provides that the 
contract is to be interpreted pursuant to the laws of a state that has enacted the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act, as proposed by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, or any substantially similar law, is voidable and the 
agreement shall be interpreted pursuant to the laws of this State if the party against whom 
enforcement of the choice of law provisions is sought is a resident of this State or has its 
principal place of business located in this State. For purposes of this section, a “computer 
information agreement” means an agreement that would be governed by the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act or substantially similar law as enacted in the state 
specified in the choice of law provisions if that state's law were applied to the agreement. This 
section may not be varied by agreement of the parties. This section shall remain in force until 
such time as the North Carolina General Assembly enacts the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act or any substantially similar law and that law becomes effective. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2003). 
 99. See the American Library Association, at http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/Woissues/ 
copyrightb/ucita/states.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004). See also Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator 
Orders Groceries Online and Your Car Dials 911 After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for 
the World of Smart Goods?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 243 n.10 (2002). Such bomb-shelter 
statutes protect residents of enacting states from being subjected to the choice of law provisions of 
UCITA. Id. at 243. 
 Another possible bomb-shelter state is Massachusetts, where Representative Mariano introduced 
an anti-UCITA bill in December of 2002.  
 100. ALA American Library Association Washington Office, UCITA Flash Report: Some States 
Targeted Early for 2003 Introductions, January 2003. 
 101. Id. 
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liberal provisions, which overwhelmingly favor sellers, and the lack of 
recourse available to buyers.102
Still convinced that the law of modern consumer transactions needed to 
be updated and unsupportive of UCITA, ALI resumed its efforts to amend 
Article 2.103 The primary issues to be resolved were “articulating what 
combinations of goods and computer programs should be considered 
within the scope of Article 2, the limitations on the application of Article 2 
to the computer programs included in ‘smart goods,’ and the extent to 
which Article 2 should apply to mixed transactions other than smart 
goods.”104 One common example is an automobile containing a computer 
chip that controls the automatic braking system of the vehicle:105 “The 
consensus was that, in the event of a failure of the breaking [sic] system, 
the buyer of the car be able to proceed under Article 2, and not have its 
remedies depend upon its proof of whether the hardware or the software 
was the cause.”106
There have been many developments along the way to reaching formal 
approval. Numerous drafts were considered. “[S]ome . . . attempted to 
draw clear, hard lines; others were more flexible. Some drafts included 
detailed tests and careful definitions; others did not. Some drafts had 
extensive black letter outlining covered transactions; others were short and 
simple.”107 The Drafting Committee eventually determined that the 
proposed amendments should not include a modification of Article 2’s 
 102. Braucher, supra note 99, at 250 (highlighting UCITA’s favoritism of software producers, 
shown through “explicit approval to holding back terms” until after a product is received, low standard 
of performance that “cuts off certain customers’ right to exit the transaction,” and, in some cases, “not 
allow[ing] recovery of consequential and incidental damages”); Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 68–74 
(mentioning unfair default rules such as validation of shrink wrap licenses, limited duration of 
licenses, limited number of eligible users, restrictions on transferability of licenses, and acceptance of 
self-help measures used by sellers if they believe licensees have violated the rules); Americans for Fair 
Electronic Commerce Transactions, AFFECT: What is UCITA? What’s Wrong With UCITA?, at 
http://www.ucita.com/what_problems.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003) (citing problems including end 
user liability for infringement on a third party’s intellectual property rights, allowing license fees to be 
required after the software is used for a designated period of time, enabling sellers to avoid suit for 
breach of contract, and allowing sellers to remotely shut off the software necessary to operate a 
buyer’s computer system). 
 103. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). 
 104. Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to the Scope of Article 2, The American 
Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan, 26, 2003). 
 105. Boss, supra note 1, at 145 n.47. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Boss, supra note 104. 
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scope.108 ALI membership approved the proposed amendments, presented 
without a change in Article 2’s scope, at its annual meeting in 2001.109
The ALI-approved amendments were then sent to NCCUSL, which, 
though the primary backer of UCITA, had again teamed up with ALI in an 
attempt to amend Article 2.110 At its meeting, NCCUSL made “significant 
changes to the scope provision of Article 2.”111 The new provision 
“attempted to articulate a line between those transactions within the scope 
of Article 2 and those outside.”112 The stated scope was still defined as 
“transactions in goods,”113 but the definition of goods was changed to 
expressly exclude the term “information.”114 This exclusion of information 
was meant only to encompass “information not associated with goods.”115 
 108. Boss, supra note 1, at 146. 
 109. Id.  
 110.  The ALI Reporter (Summer 2002), UCC Update, at http://www.ali.org/ali/ 
R2404_3_UCC.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 111. Id. NCCUSL also made two other unrelated changes to other provisions affecting statute of 
frauds and liquidated damages. The American Law Institute, Report of ALI Council Consideration of 
UCC Projects, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/ALIReport_Liebman1002.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 
2003). 
 112. Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to the Scope of Article 2, The American 
Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 113. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 2—Sales, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/2002act.htm (Aug. 2, 
2002). 
 114. Id. The amendment defines “goods” as: 
[A]ll things that are movable at the time of identification to a contract for sale. The term 
includes future goods, specifically manufactured goods, the unborn young of animals, 
growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in Section 2-107. 
The term does not include information, the money in which the price is to be paid, investment 
securities under Article 8, the subject matter of foreign exchange transactions, and choses in 
action. 
Id. at § 2-103(k). See also Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to the Scope of Article 2, 
The American Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
In the amendment, the definition of goods was moved from Section 2-105 to Section 2-103. National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 2—Sales, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/2002act.htm (last modified August 2, 
2002). In addition, a similar change was made to the definition of goods as defined in Article 2A: 
Leases. The ALI Reporter (Summer 2002), UCC Update at http://www.ali.org/ali/R2404_3_UCC.htm 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 115. The ALI Reporter (Summer 2002), UCC Update at http://www.ali.org/ali/ 
R2404_3_UCC.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). Excluding only information not associated with goods 
leaves information that is associated with goods within the possible scope of Article 2. The fact that 
minimal further guidance was given regarding mixed products is a large contributor of the uncertainty 
regarding where the scope will eventually settle. 
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While NCCUSL did not approve the amendments in 2001,116 it gave the 
necessary approval at its 2002 annual meeting.117  
The approval recognized the fact that, in general, Article 2 continues to 
serve very well the needs of those engaged in commercial transactions.118 
The proposed amendments also reflected, however, “an inability to reach 
reasonable consensus on some issues.”119 On contested issues, the 
responsibility was left to the courts to “continue to develop the law 
through cases that respond to the circumstances under which the issues are 
presented for resolution. . . .”120
The Council of ALI then considered and approved the amendments, as 
modified by NCCUSL, at its fall meeting.121 Because the text differs from 
the text approved by ALI at its 2001 annual meeting,122 the proposal again 
went before the full body of the ALI at its 2003 annual meeting, where it 
was approved.123 Approved amendments are then proposed for enactment 
by the states.124
 116. Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to the Scope of Article 2, The American 
Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 117. Id. NCCUSL was apparently willing to approve to proposed amendments in 2001, but ALI 
members of the Drafting Committee stated they would not recommend ALI approval of a draft which 
included the new scope provision. Id. The Drafting Committee considered other options and in 2002 
presented a new proposal with a modified definition of goods, which a majority of ALI members of 
the Committee supported. Id. 
 118. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). The Prefatory Note bases the success of Article 2 on its flexibility in allowing parties to 
adapt various provisions by agreement, “including course of performance, course of dealing and usage 
of trade.” Id. Success was also attributed to the courts, which have “appl[ied] its provisions sensibly.” 
Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. The Prefatory Note also indicated that “the fact that a particular issue is not addressed by 
these amendments does not necessarily reflect approval or disapproval of existing cases addressing 
that issue.” Id. 
 121. The ALI Reporter (Fall 2002), Council Approves Article 2 Amendments, at 
http://www.ali.org/ali/R2501_01_Art2.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). The Council of ALI is 
responsible for giving preliminary approval or disapproval and sending the recommendation on to the 
full body of ALI. Id. 
 122. Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to the Scope of Article 2, The American 
Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). The text 
differs in three significant ways: (1) scope, (2) statute of frauds, and (3) liquidated damages. Id. 
 123. The ALI Reporter (Summer 2003), Institute Approves UCC Drafts, at 
http://www.ali.org/ali/R2504_02-drafts.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
 124. Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to Scope of Article 2, The American Law 
Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
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If the amendment excluding information from the definition of goods is 
enacted by the states, the scope of Article 2 will initially be very 
uncertain.125 This predicted uncertainty is due to the fact that the Code will 
contain no guidance as to what constitutes information.126 ALI and 
NCCUSL have already indicated that it will be for the courts to determine 
a definition127 and to apply it in deciding what products should be 
considered information rather than goods.128
The treatment of electronic transfers of information, such as software, 
downloaded items, and other forms of information is not likely to be 
disputed.129 Pure data and downloaded products and files are clearly 
information, since they have no tangible existence.  
Mixed goods, on the other hand, will once again provide a problem for 
courts.130 Like their predecessors that combined goods and services,131 
products that contain both a good and an information component fall 
neither clearly within Article 2 nor clearly without.132 NCCUSL suggested 
in its proposed Preliminary Comment to the amended Article 2 that “the 
sale of ‘smart goods’ such as an automobile is a transaction in goods fully 
within Article 2 even though the automobile contains many computer 
programs. On the other hand, an architect’s provision of architectural plans 
 125. The amendment is made to clarify Article 2’s scope, which it will do to the extent that 
information is clearly excluded. The problem, however, will lie in the initial application of the new 
scope. It is difficult to predict how the courts will articulate the definition of information, and what 
distinctions will be drawn between pure information and information associated with a good. 
 126. The amendment deliberately fails to articulate a definition of information. See supra notes 
110–24. perhpas one reason for the exclusion is to enable the definition of information to change as the 
field of data and electronics expands. Such flexibility may be desired in the long term, but the short-
term effects of choosing to forego a definition of information will likely cause differences of opinion 
and judicial headaches. 
 127. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. In stating that the amended Article 2 would not apply to electronic transfers of 
information, NCCUSL’s preliminary comment cites Specht v. Netscape, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), as an example of products to which the Article would not apply. Id. ALI has also 
taken the stance that “Article 2 would not directly apply to a download of information.” The ALI 
Reporter (Summer 2002), UCC Update, at http://www.ali.org/ali/R2404_3_UCC.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). See also Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. 
REV. 459 (2000). 
 130. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). 
 131. See supra notes 35–55 and accompanying text. 
 132. Id. 
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on a diskette would not be a transaction in goods.”133 The Prefatory Note 
states that “smart goods” such as cars will be covered by Article 2, but 
does not articulate why this is so.134 This leaves the question of where to 
draw the line regarding what constitutes information. Another question 
that should be asked ponders how consumers are to distinguish between 
those products covered by Article 2 and those that are not. NCCUSL’s 
Comment goes on to state that, “[w]here a transaction includes both the 
sale of goods and the transfer of rights in information . . .,”135 courts have 
the responsibility of, yet again, devising a workable test to determine 
which law governs.136 The test, and its subsequent determination, is to be 
based on all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.137
Three options appear to be available: (1) exclude all goods 
incorporating information from Article 2 coverage, (2) include all goods 
incorporating information in Article 2 coverage, or (3) examine each 
situation on a case-by-case basis. 
The first option the courts could take would be to exclude all products 
containing information from the scope of Article 2. This rule would 
exclude information-only products, as well as mixed-goods products that 
include information. An all-exclusive approach is not likely to be taken, 
however, because it would exclude many transactions that consumers 
expect to be covered by Article 2.138 An automobile, for example, is a 
good that most consumers would expect to be under the protection of 
Article 2. The bottom line, however, is that NCCUSL has stated that 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. The courts are back to a similar situation as the situation faced in determining governing 
law in transactions involving products consisting of both good and service components. See supra 
notes 35–55 and accompanying text. 
 137. Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to the Scope of Article 2, The American 
Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003). 
 138. An exclusion of this sort is in line with AFFECT’s arguments against UCITA. Under 
UCITA, a computer is defined as “an electronic device that accepts information in a digital or similar 
form and manipulates it for a result based on a sequence of instructions.” Americans for Fair 
Electronic Commerce Transactions, AFFECT: What is UCITA? Glossary of Terms, at 
http://www.ucita.com/what_glossary.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). 
 The importance of such a definition is that many products consumers would consider goods and 
would expect to be governed by the UCC could in fact be considered computers and therefore fall 
outside the scope of the amended Article 2. Id. AFFECT gives the example of a pacemaker—a device 
most consumers would consider a tangible good regulated by the UCC. Id. In actuality, because a 
pacemaker uses software to regulate heart beats, it would be considered a computer under the UCITA 
definition. Id. Without an articulated definition of information contained in the text of amended Article 
2, it is foreseeable that outside definitions, including the UCITA definition, may influence courts’ 
decisions as to the scope of Article 2. 
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Article 2 will apply to automobiles.139 Therefore, to implement an all-
exclusive approach, the courts would have to completely disregard 
NCCUSL’s guidance.140
The second option available to courts is to include all products 
containing information in the scope of Article 2. An all-inclusive approach 
has some initial appeal. The fact that so few states have adopted UCITA 
indicates that an alternate governing law is desired in those jurisdictions. 
An application of general contract law is possible,141 but would not give 
consumers the confidence they may otherwise have under the formal 
governance of the UCC. 
The all-inclusive approach presents a problem, however, because 
including all products would mean including those which consisted of 
solely information. This is an unworkable rule, because the purpose of 
modifying the language of Article 2 was to exclude information.142 
Additionally, NCCUSL’s Preliminary Comment expressly states that 
“Article 2 would not directly apply to an electronic transfer of 
information. . . .”143 This option, therefore, would have to be modified to 
include only those products that are mixed. Information-only products 
would be excluded, while goods containing any component of 
information, no matter how large or how small, would be automatically 
included and thus governed by Article 2. The problem with an all-
inclusive approach is that too many products that the amendment meant to 
exclude would be included.144
 139. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). 
 140. Id. 
 141. This would, in effect, be very similar to applying Article 2, since its influence pervades 
nearly all aspects of general sales law. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Amelia H. Boss, Summary of NCCUSL Changes to the Scope of Article 2, The American 
Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org/forum4/902SCOPE.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003). The stated 
purpose of the amendment was to upgrade the law to accommodate modern computer transactions, 
which was determined to be most plausible through an explicit elimination of information from the 
definition of goods. Id. 
 143. The American Law Institute, New Prefatory Note and Language on Scope for UCC Article 2 
Amendments Approved by NCCUSL, at http://www.ali.org/ali/pr081402NCCUSL.htm (last visited Jan. 
26, 2003). 
 144. The driving force behind the amendments to Article 2’s scope was to adapt the Code to new 
types of transactions that had emerged. Id. The amendments were meant to update the Article to 
“accommodate electronic commerce and to reflect development of business practices, changes in other 
law, and interpretive difficulties of practical significance.” Id. If courts were to continue automatically 
applying Article 2 to mixed goods transactions, the entire effort put into creating the amendments will 
have been wasted. 
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A third option also exists for courts.145 Rather than adopting a bright-
line rule including or excluding information, courts could select the 
governing law on a case-by-case basis. This option is, in most ways, 
simply an extension of the predominant purpose test.146 A case-by-case 
examination would have courts looking at various factors147 and 
determining the underlying purpose for initially entering into the contract. 
If the purpose was to sell the goods, Article 2 applies; if the purpose was 
to sell information, Article 2 does not.148
IV. PROPOSAL 
After considering the options available for courts, this Note proposes 
that the predominant purpose test be applied to products comprised of both 
goods and information. 
Courts are already familiar with this method of determining applicable 
law.149 For many years the predominant purpose test has been used to 
discern which products that also contain services should be considered 
goods and therefore which products should be governed by Article 2.150 
Judges have extensive experience analyzing the relevant factors,151 
weighing those factors,152 and formulating a reasoned decision as to what 
law applies.153 Extending this process to products containing both goods 
and information will assist in providing certainty to consumers, as various 
courts will not be interpreting and applying a new standard in differing 
ways. Instead, the test used will be consistent among judicial divisions. 
While time is necessary for case law to develop, once precedent and 
guidance do evolve, buyers and sellers will have a more concrete set of 
decisions that can help guide behavior in commercial transactions. 
Allowing for flexibility,154 as the predominant purpose test does, would 
also discourage law-shopping. If the determination of what products were 
 145. The gravamen test is also an option, but because it has been used by only a minority of the 
courts in the goods-services context, it is unlikely to be considered more applicable in the current 
situation. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 38–51 and accompanying text. 
 147. Various factors would be considered toward the end of understanding the background 
characteristics of the contract. The contract could then be analyzed to see if, based on policy 
considerations, Article 2 should govern. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 38–51 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 38–51 and accompanying text. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Allowing for flexibility was one of the stated reasons for declining to expressly define 
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governed by Article 2 was made by a hard-and-fast rule, parties would 
then have an incentive to structure the transaction such that it served their 
own individual interests and provided a greater personal benefit. If all 
products containing information were included, for example, and an 
information seller would profit more by having Article 2 apply, the seller 
could easily manipulate governing law. By either characterizing the 
product as a good which contained information or by including a minute 
tangible item which qualified as a good, the entire product, even though it 
was comprised substantially of information, would be governed by Article 
2. Law-shopping by modifying the components of a product is not 
something that courts should promote, encourage, or allow. Law-shopping 
ignores the economic realities and the underlying motivation of the 
transaction. 
Additionally, the predominant purpose test would take into account the 
policy reasons for which the UCC was originally drafted.155 The initial 
purpose for the Code was to provide consumers with laws which would be 
applied uniformly in regions of the country in which they may do 
business.156 The exclusion of information is primarily due to the fact that 
the provisions of Article 2 simply do not lend themselves to products such 
as software and data.157 Pure information and similar types of products 
will be best served if governed by a separate law.158
The provisions of Article 2 do apply, however, to some products 
comprised of a portion of information. A car, for example, while 
containing computer programs that perform functions essential for driving, 
is still capable of being inspected for quality assurances, accepted as 
complete by a purchaser, or returned to a seller without fear that it has 
been copied or pirated.159 Using the predominant purpose test, a court 
information. Using the flexibility of the predominant purpose test will also help in achieving the vision 
of the amendment’s drafters. 
 155. See supra notes 18–34 and accompanying text. 
 156. Nimmer, supra note 18, at 4–5. 
 157. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. These products cannot be inspected 
beforehand and cannot be returned after delivery because there is no way to guarantee that the product 
has not been duplicated. Pure informational products are able to be copied easily and oftentimes are 
not even owned by a consumer, but instead are licensed. Kinstlick, supra note 59, at 66. The 
guarantees of Article 2 cannot be readily applied in situations such as these. 
 158. The law that will eventually govern transactions involving pure information is still unclear. 
UCITA was an attempt to create a separate law to govern these alternate types of transactions. See 
supra notes 89–102 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, UCITA has not been accepted by more 
than a handful of states. Id. Whether UCITA is embraced by a greater number of states or if software 
and data are simply to be governed by the common law remains to be seen. 
 159. Consumers with access to the necessary technology can still reverse engineer and duplicate 
products, but that option is only available over a long-term period. The UCC, in protecting buyers and 
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would likely see such a car as a good—after all, the purpose of the product 
is to enable consumers to drive, not to determine their position via the 
car’s Global Positioning System or to monitor the miles remaining before 
the gas tank is empty. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The amendment to Article 2 of the UCC expressly excludes 
information from the definition of goods.160 Because information is not 
defined in any manner within Article 2 itself, however, the future scope of 
the Article’s application is uncertain.161 The responsibility will fall on the 
courts to determine what constitutes information, especially in the case of 
a mixed product. 
Using previous lessons learned, the courts will likely handle the new 
controversy smoothly.162 The transition should be eased because the 
situation can easily be analogized to one that arose in the past—products 
involving a combination of both goods and services.163 For products 
containing both goods and services, the courts have applied a predominant 
purpose test.164 Where mixed products combining goods and information 
are involved, the courts should apply the predominant purpose test as well. 
The underlying issues as to reasons for inclusion or exclusion from the 
Article’s scope are the same. Just as services cannot be inspected or 
returned if dissatisfactory, neither can information. Courts are already 
familiar with the predominant purpose test and can provide consumers 
with that same security Karl Llewelyn envisioned more than a half-century 
ago: a law that would be applied uniformly across the country, so that 
buyers and sellers were given the protection necessary to build a thriving 
economy. 
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sellers, is more focused on the short term; therefore, concerns over duplications which may take many 
months or years are not especially relevant. 
 160. See supra notes 103–24 and accompanying text. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See supra notes 35–55 and accompanying text. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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